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Investigations
Burying The Lancet Report
By Nicolas J. S. Davies
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Over a year ago
an international team of epidemiologists, headed by
Les Roberts of Johns Hopkins School of Public Health,
completed a cluster sample survey of civilian
casualties in Iraq. Its findings contradicted central
elements of what politicians and journalists had presented
to the U.S. public and the world. After excluding any
possible statistical anomalies, they estimated that
at least 98,000 Iraqi civilians had died in the previous
18 months as a direct result of the invasion and occupation
of their country. They also found that violence had
become the leading cause of death in Iraq during that
period. Their most significant finding was that the
vast majority (79 percent) of violent deaths were caused
by coalition forces using helicopter
gunships, rockets or other forms of aerial weaponry,
and that almost half (48 percent) of these were children,
with a median age of 8.
When
the teams findings were published in the Lancet,
the official journal of the British Medical Association,
they caused quite a stir and it seemed that the first
step had been taken toward a realistic accounting of
the human cost of the war. The authors made it clear
that their results were approximate. They discussed
the limitations of their methodology at length and emphasized
that further research would be invaluable in giving
a more precise picture.
A year later, we do not have a more precise picture.
Soon after the study was published, U.S. and British
officials launched a concerted campaign to discredit
its authors and marginalize their findings without seriously
addressing the validity of their methods or presenting
any evidence to challenge their conclusions. Today the
continuing aerial bombardment of Iraq is still a dark
secret to most Americans and the media present the same
general picture of the war, focusing on secondary sources
of violence.
Roberts has been puzzled and disturbed by this response
to his work, which stands in sharp contrast to the way
the same governments responded to a similar study he
led in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2000. In
that case, he reported that about 1.7 million people
had died during 22 months of war and, as he says, Tony
Blair and Colin Powell quoted those results time and
time again without any question as to the precision
or validity. In fact the UN Security Council promptly
called for the withdrawal of foreign armies from the
Congo and the U.S. State Department cited his study
in announcing a grant of $10 million for humanitarian
aid.
Roberts conducted a follow-up study in the Congo that
raised the fatality estimate to three million and Tony
Blair cited that figure in his address to the 2001 Labor
Party conference. In December 2004 Blair dismissed the
epidemiological teams work in Iraq, claiming,
Figures from the Iraqi Ministry of Health, which
are a survey from the hospitals there, are in our view
the most accurate survey there is.
This statement by Blair is particularly interesting
because the Iraqi Health Ministry reports, whose accuracy
he praised, have confirmed the Johns Hopkins teams
conclusion that aerial attacks by coalition
forces are the leading cause of civilian deaths. One
such report was cited by Nancy Youssef in the Miami
Herald of September 25, 2004 under the headline
U.S. Attacks, Not Insurgents, Blamed for Most
Iraqi Deaths. The Health Ministry had been reporting
civilian casualty figures based on reports from hospitals,
as Blair said, but it was not until June 2004 that it
began to differentiate between casualties inflicted
by coalition forces and those from other
causes. From June 10 to September 10 it counted 1,295
civilians killed by U.S. forces and their allies and
516 killed in terrorist operations. Health
Ministry officials told Youssef that the statistics
captured only part of the death toll, and emphasized
that aerial bombardment was largely responsible for
the higher numbers of deaths caused by the coalition.
The breakdown (72 percent U.S.) is remarkably close
to that attributed to aerial bombardment in the Lancet
survey (79 percent).
BBC World Affairs editor John Simpson, in another Health
Ministry report covering July 1, 2004 to January 1,
2005, cited 2,041 civilians killed by U.S. and allied
forces versus 1,233 by insurgents (only
62 percent U.S.). Then something strange happened. The
Iraqi Health Ministers office contacted the BBC
and claimed, in a convoluted and confusing statement,
that their figures had somehow been misrepresented.
The BBC issued a retraction and details of deaths caused
by coalition forces have been notably absent
from subsequent Health Ministry reports.
Official and media criticism of Robertss work
has focused on the size of his sample, 988 homes in
33 clusters distributed throughout the country, but
other epidemiologists reject the notion that this is
controversial.
Michael OToole, the director of the Center for
International Health in Australia, says: Thats
a classical sample size. I just dont see any evidence
of significant exaggeration
. If anything, the
deaths may have been higher because what they are unable
to do is survey families where everyone has died.
David
Meddings, a medical officer with the Department of Injuries
and Violence Prevention at the World Health Organization,
said that surveys of this kind always have uncertainty,
but I dont think the authors ignored that
or understated. Those cautions I dont believe
should be applied any more or less stringently to a
study that looks at a politically sensitive conflict
than to a study that looks at a pill for heart disease.
Roberts has also compared his work in Iraq to other
epidemiological studies: In 1993, when the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control randomly called 613 households
in Milwaukee and concluded that 403,000 people had developed
Cryptosporidium in the largest outbreak ever recorded
in the developed world, no one said that 613 households
was not a big enough sample. It is odd that the logic
of epidemiology embraced by the press every day regarding
new drugs or health risks somehow changes when the mechanism
of death is their armed forces.
The campaign to discredit Roberts, the Johns Hopkins
team, and the Lancet used the same methods that
the U.S. and British governments have employed consistently
to protect their monopoly on responsible
storytelling about the war. By dismissing the studys
findings out of hand, U.S. and British officials created
the illusion that the authors were suspect or politically
motivated and discouraged the media from taking them
seriously. This worked disturbingly well. Even opponents
of the war continue to cite much lower figures for civilian
casualties and innocently attribute the bulk of them
to Iraqi resistance forces or terrorists.
The figures most often cited for civilian casualties
in Iraq are those collected by Iraqbodycount, but its
figures are not intended as an estimate of total casualties.
Its methodology is to count only those deaths that are
reported by at least two reputable international
media outlets in order to generate a minimum number
that is more or less indisputable. Its authors know
that thousands of deaths go unreported in their count
and say they cannot prevent the media misrepresenting
their figures as an actual estimate of deaths.
Beyond the phony controversy regarding the methodology
of the Lancet report, there is one issue that
does cast doubt on its findings. This is the decision
to exclude the cluster in Fallujah from its computations
due to the much higher number of deaths that were reported
there (even though the survey was completed before the
widely reported assault on the city in November 2004).
Roberts wrote, in a letter to the Independent,
Please understand how extremely conservative we
were: we did a survey estimating that 285,000 people
have died due to the first 18 months of invasion and
occupation and we reported it as at least 100,000.
The dilemma he faced was this: in the 33 clusters surveyed,
18 reported no violent deaths (including one in Sadr
City), 14 other clusters reported a total of 21 violent
deaths and the Fallujah cluster reported 52 violent
deaths. This last number is conservative because, as
the report stated, 23 households of 52 visited
were either temporarily or permanently abandoned. Neighbors
interviewed described widespread death in most of the
abandoned homes but could not give adequate details
for inclusion in the survey.
Leaving aside this last factor, there were three possible
interpretations of the results from Fallujah. The first,
and indeed the one Roberts adopted, was that the team
had randomly stumbled on a cluster of homes where the
death toll was so high as to be totally unrepresentative
and therefore not relevant to the survey. The second
possibility was that this pattern among the 33 clusters,
with most of the casualties falling in one cluster and
many clusters reporting zero deaths, was an accurate
representation of the distribution of civilian casualties
in Iraq under precision aerial bombardment.
The third possibility was that the Fallujah cluster
was atypical, but not sufficiently abnormal to warrant
total exclusion from the study, so that the number of
excess deaths was somewhere between 100,000 and 285,000.
Without further research, there is no way to determine
which of these three possibilities is correct.
No new survey of civilians killed by coalition
forces has been produced since the Health Ministry report
last January, but there is strong evidence that the
air war has intensified during this period. Independent
journalists have described the continuing U.S. assault
on Ramadi as Fallujah in slow motion. Smaller
towns in Anbar province have been targets of air raids
for the past several months, and towns in Diyala and
Baghdad provinces have also been bombed. Seymour Hersh
has covered the under-reported air war in
the New Yorker and writes that the current U.S.
strategy is to embed U.S. Special Forces with Iraqi
forces to call in air strikes as U.S. ground forces
withdraw, opening the way for heavier bombing with even
less media scrutiny (if that is possible).
One ignored feature of the surveys results is
the high number of civilian casualties reported in Fallujah
in August 2004. It appears that U.S. forces took advantage
of the media focus on Najaf at that time to conduct
very heavy attacks against Fallujah. This is perhaps
a clue to the strategy by which they have conducted
much of the air war. The heaviest bombing and aerial
assault at any given time is likely to be somewhere
well over the horizon from any well-publicized U.S.
military operation, possibly involving only small teams
of Special Forces on the ground. But cynical military
strategy does not let the media off the hook for their
failure to find out what is really going on and tell
the outside world about it. Iraqi and other Arab journalists
can still travel through most of the country and news
editors should pay close attention to their reports
from areas that are too dangerous for Western reporters.
A second feature of the epidemiologists findings
that has not been sufficiently explored is the one suggested
above by Michael OToole. Since their report establishes
that aerial assault and bombardment is the leading cause
of violent death in Iraq and, since a direct hit by
a 500 pound Mark 82 bomb will render most houses uninhabitable,
any survey that disregards damaged, uninhabited houses
is sure to underreport deaths. This should be taken
into account by any follow-up studies.
Thanks to Roberts, his international team, Johns Hopkins
School of Public Health, and the editorial board of
the Lancet, we have a clearer picture of the
violence taking place in Iraq than that presented by
mainstream media. Allowing for 16 months
of the air war and other deaths since the completion
of the survey, we have to estimate that somewhere between
185,000 and 700,000 people have died as a direct result
of the war. Coalition forces have killed anywhere from
70,000 to 500,000 of them, including 30,000 to 275,000
children under the age of 15.
Roberts has cautioned me to remember that whether someone
is killed by a bomb, a heart attack during an air strike,
or a car accident fleeing the chaos, those who initiated
the war and who stay the course bear the
responsibility.
As someone who has followed this war closely, I find
the results of the study to be consistent with what
I have seen gradually emerging as the war has progressed,
based on the work of courageous, mostly independent
reporters, and glimpses through the looking glass as
more and more cracks appear in the official story.
Nicolas
J.S. Davies is indebted to Medialens, a British media
watchdog group, for some of the material in this report.
This article was first published by Online Journal.
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