Q: How might response to the attacks come to constrict our freedoms? For instance, does terrorism give government the right to put us under surveillance, in order to trace suspects and prevent future attacks?
CHOMSKY: A response that is too abstract may be misleading, so let us consider a current and quite typical illustration of what plans to relax constraints on state violence mean in practice. This morning (September 21), the New York Times ran an opinion piece by Michael Walzer, a respected intellectual who is considered a moral leader. He called for an “ideological campaign to engage all the arguments and excuses for terrorism and reject them”; since, as he knows, there are no such arguments and excuses for terrorism of the kind he has in mind, at least on the part of anyone amenable to reason, in effect this translates as a call to reject efforts to explore the reasons that lie behind terrorist acts that are directed against states he supports. He then proceeds, in conventional fashion, to enlist himself among those who provide “arguments and excuses for terrorism,” tacitly endorsing political assassination, namely, Israeli assassinations of Palestinians who israel claims support terrorism; no evidence is offered or considered necessary, and in many cases even the suspicions appear groundless. And the inevitable “collateral damage”—women, children, others nearby—is treated in the standard way. US-supplied attack helicopters have been used for such assassinations for 10 months.
Walzer puts the word “assassination” in quotes, indicating that in his view, the term is part of what he calls the “fervid and highly distorted accounts of the blockade of Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” He is referring to criticism of US-backed Israeli atrocities in the territories that have been under harsh and brutal military occupation for almost 35 years, and of US policies that have devastated the civilian society of Iraq (while strengthening Saddam Hussein). Such criticisms are marginal in the US, but too much for him, apparently. By “distorted accounts”, perhaps Walzer has in mind occasional references to the statement of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright over national TV when she was asked about the fact of over one million deaths, half of which were children, as a result of the sanctions. She recognized that such consequences were a “hard choice” for her administration, but said “we think the price is worth it.”
I mention this single example, easily multiplied, to illustrate the substantive meaning of the relaxation of constraints on state action. We may recall that violent and murderous states quite commonly justify their actions as “counter-terrorism”: for example, the Nazis fighting partisan resistance. And such actions are commonly justified by respected intellectuals.
That is not ancient history. In December 1987, at the peak of concern over international terrorism, the UN General Assembly passed its major resolution on the matter, condemning the plague in the strongest terms and calling on all nations to act forcefully to overcome it. The resolution passed 153-2 (US and Israel), Honduras alone abstaining. The offending passage states “that nothing in the present resolution could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter of the United Nations, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes and foreign occupation or other forms of colonial domination, nor the right of these peoples to struggle to this end and to seek and receive support [in accordance with the Charter and other principles of international law].” These rights are not accepted by the US and Israel; or at the time, their South African ally. For Washington, the African National Congress was a “terrorist organization”, but South Africa did not join Cuba and others as a “terrorist state”. Washington’s interpretation of “terrorism” of course prevails, in practice, with human consequences that have been severe.
There is now much talk about formulating a Comprehensive Convention against Terrorism, no small task. The reason, carefully skirted in reports, is that the US will not accept anything like the offending passage of the 1987 resolution, and none of its allies will accept it either if the definition of “terrorism” conforms to official definitions in the US Code or army manuals, but only if it can somehow be reshaped to exclude the terrorism of the powerful and their clients.
To be sure, there are many factors to be considered in thinking about your question. But the historical record is of overwhelming importance. At a very general level, the question cannot be answered. It depends on specific circumstances and specific proposals.
Q: What do you think about nations acting as a “global community” during a time of war?
CHOMSKY: The “global community” strongly opposes terror, including the massive terror of the powerful states, and also the terrible crimes of September 11. But they do not act. When western states and intellectuals use the term “international community”, they are referring to themselves. For example, NATO bombing of Serbia was undertaken by the “international community” according to consistent western rhetoric, although those who did not have their heads buried in the sand knew that it was opposed by most of the world, often quite vocally. Those who do not support the actions of wealth and power are not part of “the global community”, just as “terrorism” conventionally means “terrorism directed against us and our friends”.
It is hardly surprising that Afghanistan is attempting to mimic the US, calling on Muslims for support. The scale, of course, is vastly smaller. Even as remote as they are from the world outside, Taliban leaders presumably know full well that the Islamic states are not their friends. These states have, in fact, been subjected to terrorist attack by the radical Islamist forces that were organized and trained to fight a Holy War against the USSR 20 years ago, and began to pursue their own terrorist agenda elsewhere immediately, with the assassination of Egyptian president Sadat.
Q: According to you, is an attack against Afghanistan a “war against terrorism”?
An attack against Afghanistan will probably kill a great many innocent civilians, possibly enormous numbers in a country where millions are already on the verge of death from starvation. Wanton killing of innocent civilians is terrorism, not a war against terrorism.
Q: If the attack on the WTC would have been at night, with very few victims, would the American government react in the same way?
CHOMSKY: I doubt that it would have made any difference. It would have been a terrible crime even if the toll had been much smaller. The Pentagon is more than just a “symbol”, for reasons that need no comment. As for the World Trade Center, we scarcely know what the terrorists had in mind when they bombed it in 1993 and destroyed it on September 11. But we can be quite confident that it had little to do with such matters as “globalization”, or “economic imperialism”, matters that are utterly unfamiliar to bin Laden and his associates, or other radical Islamists like those convicted for the 1993 bombings, and of no concern to them, just as they are, evidently, not concerned by the fact that their atrocities over the years have caused great harm to poor and oppressed people in the Muslim world and elsewhere, again on September 11.
Among the immediate victims are Palestinians under military occupation. Their concerns are different, and bin Laden, at least, has been eloquent enough in expressing them in many interviews: to overthrow the corrupt and repressive regimes of the Arab world and replace them with properly “Islamic” regimes, to support Muslims in their struggles against “infidels” in Saudi Arabia, which he regards as under US occupation.
It is convenient for western intellectuals to speak of “deeper causes” such as hatred of western values and progress. That is a useful way to avoid questions about the origin of the bin Laden network itself, and about the practices that lead to anger, fear, and desperation throughout the region, and provide a reservoir from which radical Islamic terrorist cells can sometimes draw. Since the answers to these questions are rather clear, and are inconsistent with preferred doctrine, it is better to dismiss the questions as “superficial” and “insignificant”, and to turn to “deeper causes” that are in fact more superficial.
Q: Can we talk of The Clash between two civilizations?
CHOMSKY: This is fashionable talk, but it makes little sense. The most extreme Islamic fundamentalist state, apart from the Taliban, is Saudi Arabia, a US client since its founding. In the 1980s, the US along with Pakistani intelligence (helped by Saudi Arabia, Britain, and others), recruited, armed, and trained the most extreme Islamic fundamentalists they could find to cause maximal harm to the Soviets in Afghanistan. As Simon Jenkins observes in the London Times, those efforts “destroyed a moderate regime and created a fanatical one, from groups recklessly financed by the Americans”. One of the indirect beneficiaries was Osama bin Laden.
Also in the 1980s, the US and UK gave strong support to their friend and ally Saddam Hussein—more secular, to be sure, but on the Islamic side of the “clash”—right through his worst atrocities, including the gassing of the Kurds, and beyond.
Also in the 1980s the US fought a major war in Central America, leaving some 200,000 tortured and mutilated corpses, millions of refugees and orphans, and four countries devastated. A prime target of the US attack was the Catholic Church, which had committed the grievous sin of adopting “the preferential option for the poor”.
Without continuing, exactly where do we find the divide between “civilizations”. Are we to conclude that there is a “clash of civilizations” with the Latin American Catholic Church on one side, and the US and the Muslim world, including the most murderous and fanatic religious elements, on the other side? I do not of course suggest any such absurdity, but exactly what are we to conclude, on rational grounds?
Q: Do you think we are using the word “civilization” properly? Would a really civilized world lead us to a global war like this?
CHOMSKY: No civilized society would tolerate anything I have just mentioned, which is of course only a tiny sample even of US history, and European history is even worse. And surely no civilized world would plunge the world into a major war instead of following the means prescribed by international law, following ample precedents.
Q: The attacks have been called an act of hate. Where do you think this hate comes from?
CHOMSKY: For the radical Islamists mobilized by the CIA and its associates, the hate is just what they express. The US was happy to support their hatred and violence when it was directed against US enemies; it is not happy when the hatred it helped nurture is directed against the US and its allies, as it had been, repeatedly, for 20 years. For the population of the region, quite a distinct category, the reasons for their feelings are not obscure. The sources of those sentiments are also quite well known.
Q: Are these attacks consequences of american politics?
CHOMSKY: The attacks are not “consequences” of US policies in any direct sense. But indirectly, of course they are consequences; that is not even controversial. There seems to be little doubt that the perpetrators come from the terrorist network that has its roots in the mercenary armies that were organized, trained, and armed by the CIA, Egypt, Pakistan, French intelligence, Saudi Arabia, and others. The organization of these forces started in 1979, if we can believe president Carter’s National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. He claimed that in mid-1979 he had instigated secret support for Mujahidin fighting against the government of Afghanistan in an effort to draw the Russians into what he called an “Afghan trap”, a phrase worth remembering. He’s very proud of the fact that they did fall into the “Afghan trap” by sending military forces to support the government six months later, with consequences that we know. The United States, along with its allies, assembled a huge mercenary army, maybe 100,000 or more, and they drew from the most militant sectors they could find, which happened to be radical Islamists, from all over. They’re called “Afghanis”, but like bin Laden, many come from elsewhere.
Bin Laden joined sometime in the 1980s. He was involved in the funding networks, which probably are the ones which still exist. They fought a Holy War against the Russian occupiers. They carried terror into Russian territory. They won the war and the Russian invaders withdrew. The war was not their only activity. In 1981, forces based in those same groups assassinated president Sadat of Egypt, who had been instrumental in setting them up. In 1983, one suicide bomber, maybe with connections to the same forces, essentially drove the US military out of Lebanon. And it continued.
By 1989, they had succeeded in their Holy War in Afghanistan. As soon as the US established a permanent military presence in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden and the rest announced that from their point of view, that was comparable to the Russian occupation of Afghanistan and they turned their guns on the Americans, as had already happened in 1983 when the US military had forces in Lebanon. Saudi Arabia is a major enemy of the bin Laden network, just as Egypt is. That’s what they want to overthrow, what they call the un-Islamic governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, other states of the Middle East, and North Africa.
In 1997, they murdered roughly 60 tourists in Egypt and destroyed the Egyptian tourist industry. And they’ve been carrying out activities all over the region for years. That’s one group. And that is an outgrowth of the wars of the 1980s and, if you can believe Brzezinski, even before, when they set the “Afghan trap”. Furthermore, as is common knowledge among anyone who pays attention to the region, the terrorists draw from a reservoir of desperation, anger, and frustration that extends from rich to poor, from secular to radical Islamist. That it is rooted in no small measure in US policies is evident and constantly articulated to those willing to listen.
Q: You said that the main practitioners of terrorism are countries like the US that use violence for political motives. When and where?
CHOMSKY: I find that question baffling. As I’ve said elsewhere, the US is, after all, the only country condemned by the World Court for international terrorism—for “the unlawful use of force” for political ends, as the Court put it—ordering the US to terminate these crimes and pay substantial reparations. The US of course dismissed the Court’s judgment with contempt, reacting by escalating the terrorist war against Nicaragua and vetoing a Security Council resolution calling on all states to observe international law. The terrorist war expanded in accordance with the official policy of attacking “soft targets”—undefended civilian targets, like agricultural collectives and health clinics—instead of engaging the Nicaraguan army. The terrorists were able to carry out these instructions, thanks to the complete control of Nicaraguan air space by the US and the advanced communications equipment provided to them by their US supervisors.
It should also be recognized that these terrorist actions were widely approved. One prominent commentator, Michael Kinsley, at the liberal extreme of the mainstream, argued that we should not simply dismiss State Department justifications for terrorist attacks on “soft targets”: a “sensible policy must meet the test of cost-benefit analysis”, he wrote, an analysis of “the amount of blood and misery that will be poured in, and the likelihood that democracy will emerge at the other end”—“democracy” as the US understands the term, an interpretation illustrated quite clearly in the region. It is taken for granted that US elites have the right to conduct the analysis and pursue the project if it passes their tests.
Even more dramatically, the idea that Nicaragua should have the right to defend itself was considered outrageous across the mainstream political spectrum in the United States. The US pressured allies to stop providing Nicaragua with arms, hoping that it would turn to Russia, as it did, that provides the right propaganda images. The Reagan administration repeatedly floated rumors that Nicaragua was receiving jet fighters from Russia—to protect its airspace, as everyone knew, and to prevent US terrorist attacks against “soft targets”. The rumors were false, but the reaction was instructive. The doves questioned the rumors, but said that if they are true, of course we must bomb Nicaragua, because it will be a threat to our security. Database searches revealed that there was scarcely a hint that Nicaragua had the right to defend itself. That tells us quite a lot about the deep-seated “culture of terrorism” that prevails in western civilization.
During the same years the US was carrying out large-scale terrorism elsewhere, including the Middle East: to cite one example, the car bombing in Beirut in 1985 outside a mosque, timed to kill the maximum number of civilians, with 80 dead and 250 casualties, aimed at a Muslim sheikh, who escaped. And it supported much worse terror: for example, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon that killed some 18,000 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians, not in self-defense, as was conceded at once; and the vicious “iron fist” atrocities of the years that followed, directed against “terrorist villagers”, as Israel put it. And the subsequent invasions of 1993 and 1996, both strongly supported by the US (until the international reaction to the Qana massacre in 1996, which caused Clinton to draw back). The post-1982 toll in Lebanon alone is another 20,000 civilians.
In the 1990s, the US provided 80 percent of the arms for Turkey’s counterinsurgency campaign against Kurds in it southeast region, killing tens of thousands, driving 2-3 million out of their homes, leaving 3,500 villages destroyed (7 times Kosovo under NATO bombs), and with every imaginable atrocity. The arms flow had increased sharply in 1984 as Turkey launched its terrorist attack and began to decline to previous levels only in 1999, when the atrocities had achieved their goal. In 1999, Turkey fell from its position as the leading recipient of US arms (Israel-Egypt aside), replaced by Colombia, the worst human rights violator in the hemisphere in the 1990s and by far the leading recipient of US arms and training, following a consistent pattern.
In East Timor, the US (and Britain) continued their support of the Indonesian aggressors, who had already wiped out about 1/3 of the population with their crucial help. That continued right through the atrocities of 1999, with thousands murdered even before the early September assault that drove 85 percent of the population from their homes and destroyed 70 percent of the country—while the Clinton administration kept to its position that “it is the responsibility of the government of Indonesia, and we don’t want to take that responsibility away from them.”
That was September 8, well after the worst of the September atrocities had been reported. By then Clinton was coming under fire to do something to mitigate the atrocities, mainly from Australia but also from home. A few days later, the Clinton administration indicated to the Indonesian generals that the game was over. They instantly reversed course. They had been strongly insisting that they would never withdraw from East Timor, and they were in fact setting up defenses in Indonesian West Timor (using British jets, which Britain continued to send) to repel a possible intervention force. When Clinton gave the word, they reversed course 180 degrees and announced that they would withdraw, allowing an Australian-led UN peacekeeping force to enter unopposed by the army. The course of events reveal very graphically the latent power that was always available to Washington, and that could have been used to prevent 25 years of virtual genocide culminating in the new wave of atrocities from early 1999. Instead, successive US administrations, joined by Britain and others in 1978 when atrocities were peaking, preferred to lend crucial support, military and diplomatic, to the killers—to “our kind of guy”, as the Clinton administration described the murderous president Suharto. These facts, clear and dramatic, identify starkly the prime locus of responsibility for these terrible crimes of 25 years—in fact, continuing in miserable refugee camps in Indonesian West Timor.
I have already mentioned the devastation of Iraqi civilian society, with about 1 million deaths, over half of them young children, according to reports that cannot simply be ignored. This is only a small sample. I am, frankly, surprised that the question can even be raised—particularly in France, which has made its own contributions to massive state terror and violence, surely not unfamiliar.
Q: Are reactions unanimous in the US? Do you share them, partly or completely?
CHOMSKY: If you mean the reaction of outrage over the horrifying criminal assault, and sympathy for the victims, then the reactions are virtually unanimous everywhere, including the Muslim countries. Of course every sane person shares them completely, not “partly”. If you are referring to the calls for a murderous assault that will surely kill many innocent people—and, incidentally, answer the perpetrator’s most fervent prayers—then there is no such “unanimous reaction”, despite superficial impressions that one might derive from watching TV. As for me, I join a great many others in opposing such actions. A great many.
Q: Do you condemn terrorism? How can we decide which act is terrorism and which one is an act of resistance against a tyrant or an occupying force? In which category do you classify the recent strike against the US?
CHOMSKY: I understand the term “terrorism” exactly in the sense defined in official US documents, such as standard military manuals: “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear.” In accord with this—entirely appropriate—definition, the recent attack on the US is certainly an act of terrorism; in fact, a horrifying terrorist crime. There is scarcely any disagreement about this throughout the world, nor should there be.
But alongside the literal meaning of the term, as just quoted from US official documents, there is also a propagandistic usage, which unfortunately is the standard one: the term “terrorism” is used to refer to terrorist acts committed by enemies against us or our allies. This propagandistic use is virtually universal. Everyone “condemns terrorism” in this sense of the term. Even the Nazis harshly condemned terrorism and carried out what they called “counter-terrorism” against the “terrorist” partisans.
The US basically agreed. It organized and conducted similar “counter-terrorism” in Greece and elsewhere in the postwar years. Furthermore, US counterinsurgency programs drew quite explicitly from the Nazi model, which was treated with respect: Wehrmacht officers were consulted and their manuals were used in designing postwar counterinsurgency programs worldwide, typically called “counter-terrorism”, matters studied in important work by Michael McClintock, in particular. Given these conventions, even the very same people and actions can quickly shift from “terrorists” to “freedom fighters” and back again.
The KLA-UCK were officially condemned by the US as “terrorists” in 1998, because of their attacks on Serb police and civilians in an effort to elicit a disproportionate and brutal Serbian response, as they openly declared. As late as January 1999, the British—the most hawkish element in NATO on this matter—believed that the KLA-UCK was responsible for more deaths than Serbia, which is hard to believe, but at least tells us something about perceptions at high levels in NATO. If one can trust the voluminous documentation provided by the State Department, NATO, the OSCE, and other western sources, nothing materially changed on the ground until the withdrawal of the KVM monitors and the bombing in late March 1999. But policies did change: the US and UK decided to launch an attack on Serbia, and the “terrorists” instantly became “freedom fighters”. After the war, the “freedom fighters” and their close associates became “terrorists”, “thugs”, and “murderers” as they carried out what from their point of view are similar actions for similar reasons in Macedonia, a US ally.
Everyone condemns terrorism, but you have to ask what they mean. You can find the answer to your question about my views in many books and articles that I have written about terrorism in the past several decades, though I use the term in the literal sense, and hence condemn all terrorist actions, not only those that are called “terrorist” for propagandistic reasons.
 |
 |